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CHAPTER FIFTEEN 
Moderating the Magnanimous Man 
Aquinas on Greatness of Soul 
MARC D. GUERRA 
In a still-influential book published sixty-three years ago, Harry Jaffa ar-
gued that St. Thomas Aquinas "mistakes Aristotle's intention:' and for that 
reason Thomas endeavors to "save" the character of the Nicomachean Ethic's 
magnanimous man "in accordance with what Thomas evidently considers a 
higher standard of perfection:'1 The higher standard of perfection Jaffa has in 
mind is "Christian ethics:' as revealed in an epigram from Winston Churchill 
that Jaffa uses to open his book: "It is baffling to reflect that what men call 
honor does not correspond always to Christian ethics:' Jaffa's argument is not 
simply that Aristotle's account of the magnanimous man differs from Aqui-
nas's; it is that Aquinas failed to understand that his account of magnanim-
ity was not identical to Aristotle's. Against this view, a growing number of 
Catholic scholars have argued that Aquinas did not get Aristotle's account of 
greatness of soul wrong. In fact, he adopted it while appending to it a distinc-
tively Christian teaching on the demands of humility and charity. The argu-
ment advanced by these scholars "is not that Aristotle's magnanimous man is 
a Christian but that his virtue ... is compatible with Christianity:'2 
i. Harry V. Jaffa, Thomism and Aristotelianism (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1972), 141. 
2. Carson Holloway, "Christianity, Magnanimity, and Statesmanship:' The Review of Politics 
61, no. 4 (Fall, 1999): 595. 
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While these two camps claim to be in fundamental opposition to each 
other, they are in reality closer to each other than either one cares to rec-
ognize. Both claim that Aquinas understood his teaching on the virtue of 
magnanimity to be identical to Aristotle's. And both claim that Aquinas's 
account of magnanimity is, to greater and lesser degrees, necessarily wed-
ded to and framed by his teachings on humility and the infused, theologi-
cal virtue of charity. However, in my view both of these positions miss the 
mark, although in different ways. Careful attention to Aristotle's account of 
magnanimity in the Nicomachean Ethics and to Aquinas's presentations of 
greatness of soul in his commentary on the Ethics and in his Summa theo-
logiae reveals that neither is the case. Aquinas's teaching on magnanimity 
knowingly parts company with Book IV of the Ethics's account of the mag-
nanimous man in important and in substantive ways. Aquinas implicitly 
critiques the Ethics's surface presentation of the magnanimous man even as 
he incorporates much of this account's teachings into his own views. 3 Aqui-
nas's view of magnanimity's role in political life is not predominantly shaped 
by his understanding of the roles that the virtues of Christian humility and 
the infused theological virtue of charity play in political life. Rather, it is 
most relevantly rooted in his recognition of the way in which justice, "the 
most excellent of all the moral virtues;'4 informs, ennobles, and transcends 
the realm of human affairs. 
Aristotle's presentation of magnanimity (megalopsychia) in Book IV of 
the Ethics diverges in subtle but perceptible ways from the manner in which 
he has previously spoken of particular virtues in this work. Aristotle here 
does not speak of magnanimity primarily as a mean between two extremes, 
as he had done in Book III when giving accounts of the ethical virtues of 
courage and moderation. Rather, Book IV's discussion of magnanimity 
3. Mary Keys makes a similar argument in her impressive Aquinas, Aristotle, and the Prom-
ise of the Common Good (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006). Keys sees ''Aquinas 
as offering a subtle yet far-reaching critique of Aristotelian magnanimity, one with roots in 
Aquinas's theology yet also comprising a philosophic reappraisal of Aristotle's account of hu-
man excellence:' She notes that her account concurs "with Vaclav Havel (1991), among others, 
that reflection on the totalitarian experiences of the twentieth century reveals the humanity 
and nobility of a magnanimity informed by humility:' See Keys, Aquinas, Aristotle, and the 
Promise of the Common Good, 144. Although I am in broad agreement with Keys on this score, 
I think Aquinas's own teaching on the virtue of magnanimity is, as I will argue, more relevantly 
informed by his understanding of the created nature of nature and the natural demands of 
justice that are upheld by the created natural order than by his "theology" or by his teaching 
on "humility" or by his emphasis on "natural human sociability" (Aquinas, Aristotle, and the 
Promise of the Common Good, 154). 
4. St. Thomas Aquinas, Summa theologiae I-II, q. 66, a. 4. All references to this work in this 
paper are to the following edition: Aquinas, Summa theologica, trans. The Fathers of the Eng-
lish Dominican Province (Westminster, Md.: Christian Classics, 1981). 
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brings to light the form that this comparatively rare virtue actually takes in 
the great-souled man. The magnanimous man subsequently is described as 
he comes to sight in his own eyes, in the eyes of serious men (spoudaios), in 
the eyes of decidedly lesser men-and, in between the lines, in the eyes of 
Aristotle himself. As Aristide Tessitore artfully puts it, in "the same way one 
views a statue by walking around it, Aristotle invites readers to ponder the 
magnanimous person from several different and even conflicting points of 
view:'5 Aristotle deliberately invites his reader to contemplate magnanimity 
not in the abstract but incarnate, that is, in the person of the great-souled 
man. Presenting his reader with a portrait of the great-souled man, Aristo-
tle gives an account of the magnanimous man's great deeds and the great 
honors he rightly claims, and at the same time provides an insightful, if not 
unproblematic, glimpse into the inner psychic life that characterizes such a 
man. As we shall see, by choosing to proceed in this way Aristotle quietly 
draws attention to an irreducible tension that marks the life of the mag-
nanimous man he describes. For on the one hand, the great-souled man "is 
incapable of living with a view to another-except a friend-since doing so 
is slavish";6 on the other, he nevertheless seeks "great honor" from others 
and looks to perform the kind of "great deed" that necessarily requires oth-
ers with whom one lives. 7 
From the time it is first mentioned in the Ethics's opening catalogue of 
the virtues, 8 Aristotle carefully distinguishes magnanimity from the more 
ordinary love of honor. Unlike its unnamed counterpart, magnanimity con-
cerns the love of honor on a grand scale. As his name indicates, the mag-
nanimous man is not simply animated by a love of honor (philotimia). He 
esteems the kind of great honor that is associated with and accompanies 
the performance of "great deeds:'9 Illustrative of this fact, he is not a man of 
constant, active civil engagement. He is both seen and said to be slow to act. 
Although his actions are few, they are "great and notable ones:'10 What is 
more, he knows that he is in fact worthy of great honors. To underscore the 
connection between his deeds and his greatness, Aristotle draws a compari-
son between greatness of soul and greatness of body. As men who are wor-
thy of little and know that they cannot be great-souled, so too can "those 
who are small ... be elegant and well-proportioned but not beautiful:'11 
5. Aristide Tessitore, Reading Aristotle's Ethics: Virtue, Rhetoric, and Political Philosophy 
(Albany, N.Y.: State University of New York Press, 1996), 28. 
6. Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, trans. Robert C. Bartlett and Susan D. Collins (Chicago: 
The University of Chicago Press, 2011), 1124b31-1125ai. 
7. Ibid., 1124b25. 8. Ibid., 1107b21-1108ai. 
9. Ibid., 1124b25. 10. Ibid., 1124b26. 
11. Ibid., 1123b6-7. 
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Aristotle,s comparison of greatness of soul and greatness of body points 
to a connection between the magnitude of a man,s deeds and the magna-
nimity he possesses. At the same time, it also hints at a factor that would 
seem to qualify the self-sufficiency of the great-souled man. For the com-
parison leads one to wonder whether magnanimity depends on chance in 
the way that beauty is said to depend on chance. The small, after all, do not 
choose to be small; their body size is given to them. Could the traits that 
enable greatness of soul be like this? Could they be traits that men might 
be able to hone, like the small are capable of honing their graceful features, 
but whose very possession initially and ultimately depends on a gift from 
chance or nature or the gods? 
Other problems associated with greatness of soul are indicated by Ar-
istotle,s claim that "in truth,, it is difficult to be magnanimous, since "it is 
not possible without gentlemanliness (kalokagathia):, 12 A true account of 
greatness of soul must show that this virtue effects the humanly desirable 
but rare union of the beautiful or the noble (to kalon) and the good (to ag-
athon). As Aristotle makes clear in his Ethics and Politics, the beautiful and 
the good traditionally are said to be united in a particular type of man, the 
kalokagathos or the gentleman. Viewed in this light, the kalokagathos is said 
to be the political man in the most proper sense of the term. In contrast to 
merely good men, who act virtuously for the sake of attaining such natu-
rally good things as wealth and honor, the gentleman acts virtuously "for 
the sake of the noble, for this is the end of virtue:,13 Truly political men, the 
men Aristotle calls gentlemen, are quite rare. Indeed, "the majority of those 
engaged in politics are not correctly called political men, for they are not 
truly political ... [but] embrace this sort of life for profit and gain:,14 Aristo-
tle, in not-so-subtle terms, thus emphasizes the difference between the kind 
of men who are "in truth,, honorable and the kind of men who are com-
monly honored in public life. Aristotle,s great-souled man thus comes to the 
fore as the most excellent man among political men, the great political actor 
or statesman par excellence. As such, he deserves the highest honors of men. 
The great-souled man,s concern with honors is qualified, however, in 
some decisive respects. He is neither unduly preoccupied with, nor ov~rly 
pleased by, the reception of honors. Quite the contrary, he takes moderate 
pleasure in honors and even then only when they come from "serious hu-
man beings;, since he recognizes that "there could be no honor worthy of 
complete virtue:'15 As the last phrase indicates, greatness of soul "seems to 
12. Ibid., 1124a3-4. 13. Ibid., 115b12-13. 
14. Aristotle, Eudemian Ethics, 1216a23-27. 15. Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, 1124a8-9. 
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be like a kind of cosmos of the virtues:'16 The virtue of magnanimity seems 
to adorn the other virtues; it appears as the peak of moral virtue, a rare 
but recognizable form of excellence that the great-souled man wears on his 
head like a crown. Somewhat perplexingly, however, the reference to mag-
nanimity being a cosmos also suggests that it is an ordered "whole" that 
comprehends all the virtues. Aristotle adds yet another piece to this puzzle 
by intimating that magnanimity by all accounts seems to include "what is 
great in each virtue:>l7 The likening of greatness of soul to a cosmos thus 
calls attention to an ambiguity concerning that virtue's treatment in the Eth-
~cs. While the question of whether it crowns or comprehends all of the other 
virtues remains unclear, Aristotle nevertheless suggests that the virtue of 
magnanimity is a complete or comprehensive virtue. 
Greatness of soul is the first of three moral virtues, the other two being 
justice and prudence, that Aristotle suggests are comprehensive in charac-
ter. Juxtaposing Aristotle's accounts of the comprehensive virtues of mag-
nanimity in Book IV and justice in Book V brings to light a tension that 
apparently plagues the life of the great-souled man. Like greatness of soul, 
justice also "is often held" to be "the greatest of the virtues:'18 Aristotle dis-
tinguishes between two senses of justice. In its comprehensive sense, the 
virtue of justice includes all of the moral virtues. 19 It represents "not a part 
of virtue but the whole of virtue:'20 Understood in this way, justice is as-
sociated with law-abidingness. 21 But in its more narrow sense, justice des-
ignates a particular virtue. Justice understood in this way denotes a concern 
with the equal (to ison). It reflects a specific form that justice can, and to 
some extent does, take in regimes. 
The initial equation of complete or comprehensive justice with the virtue 
oflaw-abidingness, however, proves to be problematic upon closer scrutiny. 
For Aristotle further draws a distinction between what is "just unqualifiedly 
(to haplos dikaion)" and what is just in "the political sense:'22 Political life 
necessarily cobbles together the natural and the conventional: "of the just 
in the political sense, one part is natural, the other, conventional:'23 Gov-
erning free and equal men who share a common life together and who are 
capable of "ruling and being ruled" in turn, the type of justice one finds 
embodied in the laws of actual cities, ultimately falls short of the kind of 
justice that would inform "the best regime;' the regime "in accord with na-
16. Ibid., 1124a1-2. 
18. Ibid., 1129b29. 
20. Ibid., 113oa8-10. 
22. Ibid., 1134a24-26. 
17· Ibid., 1123b30. 
19. Ibid., 1129b25-30. 
21. Ibid., 1129b19-25. 
23. Ibid., 1134b18-19. 
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ture:'24 Political justice, in other words, cannot perfectly achieve the lofty 
goals demanded by a strict adherence to justice. And yet it does allow for a 
way of life-and hence a place in nature, namely, the city-where men can 
(most perfectly) cultivate the excellences of their given nature. Both "in liv-
ing together and in sharing in speeches and actions:'25 political life points 
to a natural end that transcends the real but humanly limited good of "mere 
life:' that is, a life lived for self-preservation. Inasmuch as it provides the 
indispensable floorboards and some of the walling-but not the ceilings26 -
of citizens' and statesmen's aspirations to excellence, political justice helps 
secure the grounds of political life's humanizing pursuit of the just and the 
noble.27 
Whereas the justice operative in actual regimes seeks to rule the mu-
tual relations between free and equal citizens, magnanimity points not to 
an established equality among citizens but rather to a great and important 
difference between them. It is the virtue of the man whose special form of 
greatness recognizably elevates him above his fellow citizens. Juxtaposing 
the "two virtues:' Ronna Burger perceptively observes, expresses "two inde-
pendent principles-the just as a principle of equalization and the kalon as 
a principle of distinction-each of which, in its claim to represent the whole 
of ethical virtue, stands in potential conflict with the other:'28 This is reflect-
ed in the Politics's discussion of the problem raised by the presence of a man 
of outstanding virtue, whose very presence in the city raises the question 
of whether he should be allowed to rule or should be ostracized. Viewed 
together, Aristotle's treatments of the comprehensive virtues of magnanim-
ity and justice permit his reader to reflect upon the twin peaks of moral vir-
tue from two related perspectives, namely, in terms of the most preeminent 
citizens within actual regimes and in terms of the way of life that binds all 
citizens and statesmen together in cities. 
The complicated relation that the magnanimous man has with his fellow 
citizens is further analyzed in Aristotle's treatment of magnanimity in the 
Posterior Analytics. In that work, Aristotle brings up magnanimity amidst 
a discussion of the use of equivocal terms. This virtue is used there to il-
lustrate such an equivocation. Aristotle juxtaposes, on the one hand, Alcib,i-
ades, Achilles, and Ajax-real and poetically portrayed political men who 
24. Ibid., 1135a5. 
25. Ibid., 1126b11-12. 
26. See Leo Strauss, "On Natural Law;' in Studies in Platonic Political Philosophy, ed. Thom-
as Pangle (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1983), 140. 
27. Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, 1094b13. 
28. Ronna Burger, Aristotle's Dialogue with Socrates: On the Nicomachean Ethics (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 2008), 84. 
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performed great deeds on the battlefield and who were unwilling to suc-
cumb to political dishonor (to the point that their unwillingness to suffer 
dishonor finally pitted them against their fellow soldiers or citizens),29 with 
Lysander and Socrates, on the other, two men who remained "unaffected by 
good and bad fortune:' 30 Of the five men mentioned here, Socrates alone 
failed to distinguish himself in political life. If Socrates is a model of magna-
nimity, he is not a particularly political model, at least as that term is gener-
ally understood and used in the Ethics's account of greatness of soul. 
Aristotle's remarks in the Posterior Analytics raise the specter of a form 
of greatness of soul that is not explicitly political but instead unmistakably 
'philosophic. Like its political counterpart, the possession of philosophic 
magnanimity would seem to engender an uneasy relationship between its 
possessor and his fellow citizens. Despite his claim to be a good-perhaps 
even the best of-citizens, Socrates's fate resoundingly testifies to the con-
flict the citizens of democratic Athens believed they had with the philoso-
pher. Yet it also seems that, to the extent that Socrates understood philo-
sophic greatness of soul and the good it pursues to be informed by an order 
that transcends the horizons of the moral and political life, it enabled him 
not to call direct attention to the distance that separated him from his fel-
low citizens. Socrates, we should recall, was famous for his use of irony. Al-
though the depreciation of one's own abilities and worth can be a vice, the 
studied, ironic understatement of one's true greatness, a practice Aristotle 
explicitly identifies with Socrates, can be a "refined" and effective way of 
avoiding the ire of others who take exception to one who appears preten-
tious. 31 
Aristotle brings Book IV's treatment of magnanimity to a close by de-
scribing a series of traits that seem to characterize the magnanimous man as 
magnanimous man. What we could call "the surface presentation" of these 
traits casts many of them in a less than flattering light. Aristotle here does 
not go out of his way to soften this impression. Some of these traits appear 
to be amusing. The magnanimous man is said to speak in a deep, firm voice 
and possess a slow, deliberate gait. Other traits amplify the impression that 
the great-souled man consciously maintains a remarkably attenuated con-
nection to those with whom he must live. He, for instance, remembers the 
favors he has done for others, but "not those that have been done" for him. 32 
Still other traits call into question the limits of viewing human beings and 
29. See Tessitore, Reading Aristotle's Ethics, 32-33. 
30. Aristotle, Posterior Analytics, 97b25. 
3i. Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, u27b25-26. 
32. Ibid., u24b14-15. 
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the life of virtue simply within the moral/political horizon. Aristotle states 
that the magnanimous man is not prone to feel admiration33 and that in 
his view "nothing is greaf'34 On this score, Book IV's magnanimous man 
proves to be further unlike the Socrates spoken of in the Posterior Analytics 
whose capacity for admiration is connected to his ability, as Aristophanes 
and Plato note, to wonder about the things "aloft:' As if to further empha-
size this fact, Aristotle remarks that the great-souled man chooses to pos-
sess "beautiful and useless things more than useful and beneficial ones, for 
this is more the mark of a self-sufficient person" (autarchia). 35 
The magnanimous man's belief in his own self-sufficiency, that is, his be-
lief that he is a whole unto himself, moves him away from the demands 
of both justice and truth. While relating that the great-souled man fails to 
remember the good deeds that others have done for him, Aristotle invokes 
the Homeric images of Thetis and Zeus. Thetis did not remind Zeus, the 
king of the gods, of the favors she had done for him. 36 That would have 
displeased him, by bringing before him evidence of his need for others. 
The magnanimous man's belief in his Zeus-like self-sufficiency proves to be 
as untrue of him as it is of the Olympian god himself. It is tenable only as 
long as the great-souled man chooses to ignore the fact that he is dependent 
upon the city he inhabits and, by extension, upon his fellow citizens, for the 
very venue in which he can put his particular form of virtue on display. In 
this respect he is reminiscent of Aristophanes's Socrates, inasmuch as the 
magnanimous man too is depicted as being radically unappreciative of the 
social, moral, and political preconditions that allow for his particular way 
of life. Moreover, the magnanimous man's belief in his own self-sufficiency 
requires him to deny the role that chance seems to play in the exercise of 
magnanimity: for the exercise of greatness of soul necessarily requires one 
to live in a place and at a time when great deeds are both needed and can 
be performed. In short, as Robert Faulkner eloquently points out, Aristo-
tle allows us to see how the "great-souled forget their dependence and, like 
Shakespeare's Caesar, incline to imagine themselves gods:>37 
The account of magnanimity given in the Ethics thus cuts both ways. In-
sofar as it invites us to reflect upon the magnanimous man as he actually 
comes to sight in political life, the reader is able to catch a glimpse of the full 
array of qualities and tensions that typify such a man. This is one of the great 
strengths of Aristotle's presentation of magnanimity in Book IV of the Ethics. 
33. Ibid., 1125a2-3. 34. Ibid., 1125a4. 
35. Ibid., 1125a11-12. 36. See Homer, Iliad, I, 503-4. 
37. Robert Faulkner, The Case for Greatness: Honorable Ambition and Its Critics (New Ha-
ven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 2007 ), 42. 
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Aristotle's complex portrayal of the great-souled man simultaneously elicits 
our admiration for this rare man's qualities and deeds, even as it lays bare, 
and forces us to recoil from, those bumptious and problematic characteris-
tics that mark the lives of the magnanimous men one encounters in political 
life. 
In his commentary on Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics, Aquinas does not 
pass over in silence the less attractive features of Aristotle's portrait of the 
magnanimous man. 38 For the most part, he carefully explicates the surface 
argument of Aristotle's text. He does, however, conspicuously smooth out 
some of this character's more noticeable rough edges. That Aquinas con-
sistently does so indicates that he is well aware of what he is doing in the 
commentary. The tactic that he takes in this work is in keeping with his 
acknowledged effort in the Summa theologiae to reflect upon the virtue of 
magnanimity not principally as it comes to sight in the person of the Ethic's 
great-souled man, but rather in a context that is not as studiously limited 
to 'the moral and intellectual confines that characterize the city and polit-
ical life as such. His argument quietly but firmly has the overall effect of 
minimizing the opportunity for the political order to arrogate to itself the 
sole horizon or responsibility to determine the content of moral virtue. The 
thrust behind this approach is captured by Aquinas's remark in his com-
mentary, which finds no exact parallel in the Ethics, that the magnanimous 
man's "whole attention is taken up with the goods of the community and 
God:'39 
Aquinas's effort to widen the sphere in which magnanimity (magnanimi-
tas) is viewed vividly comes to sight in his comments on Aristotle's claim 
that the magnanimous man thinks nothing great and is not prone to ad-
miration. Whereas Aristotle had left it at saying that "nothing is great" to 
the magnanimous man, Aquinas remarks that "there is nothing great for 
him among the things that can happen externally, because his whole life 
is busy with internal goods, which are truly greaf'40 This statement is in 
keeping with his general tendency in this commentary to affirm and main-
tain the great-souled man's capacity to discriminate between "external" and 
"internal" goods. For example, when Aristotle asks, "why would someone 
to whom nothing is great do anything shameful;'41 Aquinas remarks that 
the great-souled man "does not place so great a value on any external thing 
38. Aquinas, Commentary on Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics, trans. C. I. Litzinger (Notre 
Dame, Ind.: Dumb Ox Books, i993), q1-82. 
39. Ibid., 779. 
40. Ibid., in 
41. Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, 1123b32. 
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(rem exteriorem) that he would wish to do a shameful action for if'42 Along 
similar lines, when Aristotle notes that the magnanimous man's deep and 
steady voice and deliberate and measured walk reflect the fact that one who 
thinks nothing great does not get excited, Aquinas states that the great-
souled man "holds nothing external of value:'43 To be sure, the magnani-
mous man found in Book IV of the Ethics is genuinely concerned with what 
Aquinas here refers to as internal goods. The great-souled man is repeatedly 
said to be drawn to and actively to pursue virtue, the kalon and the good. 
But it cannot be overlooked that in the cases mentioned above, Aquinas 
consistently chooses to accentuate the great-souled man's active discrimina-
tion between external and internal goods in a way that Aristotle, for what-
ever reason, chooses not to accentuate in the corresponding passages in the 
Ethics. 
Aristotle, as well as Plato's Socrates, affirms that philosophy begins in 
wonder. 44 Wonder is the spark that ignites a life that pursues an activity, the 
contemplation of something greater than ones self, namely, "the whole;' that 
is ultimately done for its own sake. In contrast to his reference to Socrates 
in the Posterior Analytics, Aristotle in Book IV of the Ethics remains silent 
about the magnanimous man's interest in, or actual pursuit of, philosophic 
activities. His incapacity to wonder in fact would argue against it. In other 
words, the magnanimous man appears to be a model of a particular kind of 
human excellence, the kind of excellence that can and ought to be pursued 
in political life. He excels and shines in the realm of action, more specifi-
cally, in the realm of great action. 
Aristotle's announcement at the opening of Book VII of the Ethics that 
he now makes a new beginning, however, signals that the question of virtue 
and human flourishing needs to be examined from a different perspective, 
other than that of the gentleman's, if it is to be treated adequately. In the 
sequel, the best judge of virtue and human flourishing turns out to be the 
"one who engages in philosophic inquiry about politics:' Thus, somewhat 
unexpectedly, the political philosopher is announced as "the architect of the 
end with a view to which we speak of each thing as being bad or good in an 
unqualified sense:'45 It is the philosophic life-the life of Socrates, not the 
42. Aquinas, Commentary on Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics, 747. 
43. Ibid., 782. 
44. See Aristotle, Metaphysics, 982b12; and Plato, Theaetetus, 155d. 
45. Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, 1152b1-3. For an account of one way in which this new 
beginning or "another beginning" at the opening of Book VII reverberates back on Aristotle's 
previous arguments in Books I-VI see my ''.Aristotle on Pleasure and Political Philosophy: A 
Study in Book VII of the Nicomachean Ethics;' Interpretation: A Journal of Political Philosophy 
24:2 (Winter, 1997): 171-82. 
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life of Alcibiades or Ajax or Achilles or Lysander-that is seen to possess 
the greatest kind of greatness of soul. The account of virtue given in the 
preceding six books of the Ethics, Aristotle intimates at this point, must be 
returned to and each of its claims about the nature of virtue and happiness 
must now be reexamined in light of Aristotle's announced second sailing. 
It is then rather remarkable that in his commentary on Book IV Aqui-
nas indicates that the magnanimous man is prone to speculative reflection. 
Aquinas, as Mary Keys pointedly notes, in this case "endeavors" to paint 
"magnanimity in the context of a more unified, harmonious existence, indi-
cating that greatness of soul conduces to both moral and intellectual excel-
lence."46 Amid a discussion of pusillanimity, a vice opposed to magnanimity 
that inclines a man to resist engaging "in great things" rightly and "accord-
ing to their dignity;'47 Aquinas straightforwardly states that those who "are 
ignorant of their worth ... suffer ... damage to their goodness ... they aban-
don works of virtue and the pursuit of speculative truths, as if they were 
unfitted for and unequal to things of this kind:'48 Aquinas strongly implies 
that the great-souled man is not simply defined by the realm of political life, 
even the heights or peaks of that life's honorable pursuit of the just and the 
kalon. While undoubtedly presented only in passing, the image of greatness 
of soul hinted at here reflects a greater degree of wholeness or completion 
than the tension-ridden account of the magnanimous man that Aristotle 
gives in Book IV of the Ethics. 
Aquinas's account of magnanimity in the Summa theologiae leaves little 
doubt that he sees something inadequate, and in important respects distort-
ing, about viewing greatness of soul predominantly in terms of the political 
order. 49 It also leaves little doubt that he reads Aristotle's account of magna-
nimity in Book IV of the Ethics as doing just this. Addressing the disposi-
tion of humility (a virtue, it should be noted, not explicitly mentioned in the 
Ethics) to moderate exaggerated and misguided hopes, Aquinas states that 
the Philosopher "intended to treat of virtues as directed to civic life, where 
the subjection of one man to another is defined according to the ordinance 
of the law, and is consequently a matter oflegal justice:'50 Aquinas's own ac-
count of magnanimity in the Summa theologiae refuses to treat magnanim-
ity principally in terms defined by the political order. Instead, it insists upon 
situating this virtue in a natural order of justice that informs political life 
46. Keys, Aquinas, Aristotle, and the Promise of the Common Good, 151. 
47. Aquinas, Commentary on Nicomachean Ethics, 786. 
48. Ibid., 787. 
49. Aquinas, STII-11, q. n9. 
50. Ibid., q. 161, a. 1, ad 5. 
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even as it transcends the limits of political life. As Ernest Fortin notes, by so 
doing Aquinas settles the "issue between justice and magnanimity" unam-
biguously "in favor of justice" in a way that Aristotle in his Ethics does not. 51 
In the Summa theologiae, Aquinas presents magnanimity as a part of 
courage or fortitude. Courage, one of the four cardinal virtues, helps per-
fect the irascible appetite. 52 By putting reason into the irascible passions, it 
strengthens a man's resolve to persevere in the good in the face of hardship 
and the "dangers of death:'53 Building on this line of thought, Aquinas states 
that magnanimity moves a man to take up great deeds and great works in 
the presence of formidable obstacles and perils. Furthermore, employing 
the classic distinction between form and matter, Aquinas affirms that "the 
proper matter" of the virtue of magnanimity "is great honor, and that the 
magnanimous man tends to such things as are deserving of honor:'54 Here, 
Aquinas's enlargement of the realm in which the magnanimous man is seen 
and in which he is said to act starts to become clear. The magnanimous man 
is explicitly said to exist within, and to be properly related to, a created nat-
ural order that transcends the legitimate but limited order that nature up-
holds in the life of the city. Moreover, even this is connected with the divine. 
Aquinas notes that there "is in man something great which he possesses 
through the gift of God .... Accordingly magnanimity makes a man deem 
himself worthy of great things in consideration of the gifts he holds from 
God:'55 Viewed in this heightened light, the magnanimous man recognizes 
that his greatness is something given to him; it is something he possesses 
but for which he cannot take authorial credit. 
Aquin~s's magnanimous man thus understands his particular form of 
greatness to have its roots in a gift he has received from God. The mag-
nanimous man recognizes this dependence as a matter of natural justice. 
This recognition is in keeping with the natural virtue of religion, "a moral 
virtue ... [that] is a part of justice:'56 For it belongs to the dictate of natural 
reason, he argues, that man recognizes that it is God "to Whom we ought 
to be bound as to our unfailing principle; to Whom also our choice should 
be resolutely directed as to our last end:'57 The virtue of religion, he insists, 
"is not a theological virtue whose object is the last end, but a moral vir-
tue which is properly about things referred to the end:'58 In sharp contrast 
51. Ernest L. Fortin, Classical Christianity and the Political Order: Reflections on the 1heo-
logico-Political Problem, ed. J. Brian Benestad (Lanham, Md.: Rowman & Littlefield, 1996), 169. 
52. STl-11, q. 61. 53. ST 11-11, q. 129, a. 5. 
54. Ibid., a. 2. 55. Ibid., a. 3, ad 4. 
56. Ibid., q. 81, a. 5, ad 3. 57. Ibid., a. i. 
58. Ibid., a. 5. 
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to the great-souled man of Book IV of the Ethics, Aquinas's magnanimous 
man acknowledges not only a cosmos above himself, but a cosmos that is 
ordered by and to a Being infinitely greater than the magnanimous man 
himsel£ That acknowledgment walks hand in hand with Aquinas's claim 
that the Old Law's moral precept to observe the Sabbath is itself part of the 
natural law "in so far as it commands man to give some time to the things of 
God:'59 It also walks hand in hand with his claim that the offering of sacri-
fices to God is also "of the natural law" inasmuch as this act reflects "natural 
reason['s]" recognition that man "is subject to a higher being:'60 
Aquinas's magnanimous man, however, not only looks up in a way that 
the Ethics's great-souled man has great difficulty doing, he also looks around 
him. He recognizes that he needs "human assistance ... to provide for his 
own life" in a way that the Aristotelian magnanimous man's exaggerated 
belief in his self-sufficiency prevents him from doing.61 This recognition is 
also demanded by justice; it is a demand of the special virtue of piety. 62 The 
virtue of piety acknowledges that "man becomes a debtor to other men in 
various ways, according to their various excellences and the various benefits 
· received by them:'63 After God, all men, including magnanimous men, are 
said to owe their greatest debts to their parents and their country-not sim-
ply for the contributions that one's parents and country make to the pres-
ervation of mere life, but more importantly for their contributions to the 
cultivation of the good life, since the city as city "seeks the highest among all 
human goods, for it aims at the common, which is better and more divine 
than the goods of one individua1:'64 
A full account of the ways in which the various demands of justice that 
Aquinas explicitly mentions in the Summa theologiae's thematic account of 
magnanimity frame his understanding of that virtue would obviously have 
to take into consideration the complex roles that natural law, human law, 
and prudence play in his rich reflections on the nature and scope of the 
realm of human affairs. Such a consideration goes well beyond the bounds 
of this chapter. 65 But on the basis of what has been said here it should be 
59. STI-11, q. 100, a. 3, ad 3. 
61. Ibid., q. 129, a. 6, ad. 1. 
63. Ibid., a. 1. 
60. ST 11-11, q. 85, a. 1. 
62. Ibid., q. 101, a. 3. 
64. Aquinas, Commentary on Aristotle's Politics, trans. Ernest L. Fortin and Peter D. O'Neill, 
quoted from Medieval Political Philosophy: A Sourcebook, ed. Joseph C. Macfarland and Joshua 
Parens (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1991), I, 1, 11. 
65. For insightful discussions of the relation between natural law, human law, and prudence 
in Aquinas's thought see Fortin, Classical Christianity and the Political Order, 151-75; 209-15; 
and 265-86. 
Aquinas on Greatness of Soul 265 
clear that Aquinas's treatment of magnanimity and the magnanimous man's 
relation to his fellow citizens remains in constant contact with his teach-
ing on the natural law. By retaining this connection, Aquinas is able to find 
room in the city for the magnanimous. Put somewhat differently, Aquinas 
points to a way in which one can be a magnanimous man and still take part 
in the ennobling political good that all citizens, the ordinary and the great-
souled, substantively share in common. 
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